This paper analyzes patent pools and their e¤ects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees re ‡ect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage litigation by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all-or-nothing in patent litigation. If patents are su¢ ciently weak, patent pools with complementary patents reduce social welfare as they charge higher licensing fees and chill subsequent innovation incentives.
Introduction
This paper analyzes patent pools and their e¤ects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic. The existing literature on patent pools shows that the procompetitive e¤ects of patent pools crucially depend on the relationship between the constituent patents. If the patents are complementary in nature, patent pools can reduce overall licensing royalties by internalizing pricing externalities and are thus procompetitive. However, if the patents are substitutes, then patent pools can be used as a collusive mechanism that eliminates price competition, and are thus anticompetitive (Shapiro, 2001 ; Lerner and Tirole, 2004) . We frame our model to consider the dynamic e¤ects of patent pools by investigating the e¤ects of patent pools for subsequent innovations that build on patents in the pools.
The procompetitive e¤ects of patent pools for complementary patents naturally apply to dynamic innovation incentives. As patent pools can mitigate the "patent thicket" problem for current users, they reduce royalty rates for subsequent innovations as well. As a result, follow-on innovators are less burdened by the royalty rates and innovation is promoted.
However, this simple conclusion may not hold if we entertain the possibility that patents are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. In such cases, royalty rates will re ‡ect the strength of patents. If patents are weak, then overall royalty rates can be low with independent licensing. Patent pools of complementary patents can be used as a mechanism to discourage patent litigation by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents. This imposes a proposition of all-or-nothing in patent litigation and enables patent holders to charge higher royalty rates. Patent pools can thus be used to shield weak patents from potential litigation.
Our paper is motivated by recent trends in high-tech industries. As products become more complex and sophisticated, they tend to encompass numerous complementary technologies. In addition, the innovation process is typically cumulative with new technologies building upon previous innovations (Scotchmer, 1991) . To re ‡ect such an environment, we consider a setup in which the development of a new technology requires licensing of multiple complementary patents owned by di¤erent …rms. With complementary patents, patent pools are considered to be an e¤ective way to mitigate the problem of patent thickets and reduce transaction costs. For instance, the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, recognizes that inclusion of complementary or essential patents in a patent pool is procompetitive. We point out that such a sanguine view about patent pools with complementary patents may not be justi…ed if we consider probabilistic patent rights.
To illustrate this, we develop the notion of the "litigation margin"that relates the patent holders'ability to set license fees to litigation incentives by potential licensees. When the patent holders set their license fees, they need to consider the e¤ects of a price increase on demand and litigation incentives by potential licensees. Since the incentives to litigate and invalidate patents decrease with the strength of the patents, the litigation margin is the binding constraint for patent holders when patents are weak. We show that patent pools provide a channel to relax the litigation margin, which leads to elevated license fees.
Thus, the welfare e¤ects of patent pools with complementary patents depend on whether the demand margin or the litigation margin is binding. When the demand margin is binding, the conventional result holds and patent pools are welfare-enhancing because they eliminate the pricing externality among patent holders. However, if patents are weak and the litigation margin is binding, patent pools can be welfare-reducing. Our paper thus formalizes the idea expressed in the Duplan case in which the court concluded that "[t]he ... patents in suit were known ... to be weak and, ..., they [the parties] were con…dent that these patents could be invalidated."The main purpose of the patent pool in the case was "to protect the parties from challenges to the validity of their patents" in order to gain "the power to …x and maintain prices in the form of royalties which they... exercised thereafter." 1 Package licensing by a patent owner is akin to patent pools and raises similar issues in combining multiple intellectual property rights. Package licensing has long been recognized as potentially anti-competitive, as a form of tying or bundling by competition authorities and the courts; especially, when a patent owner refuses to grant individual licenses (or alternatively, by charging a license fee that is invariant with respect to the number of patents). 2 In particular, there have been concerns that package licensing can be used as a leverage mechanism to extend market power from legitimate patent claims to illegitimate 1 ones. For instance, in American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3rd Circuit, 1959) , the court condemned package licensing that required the licensee to pay the same price regardless of the number of patents the licensee implemented. 3 The point that the bundling of intellectual property rights might decrease "private incentives to challenge the IP"has also been raised in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission Report (2007) on IP. However, the analysis of package licensing with probabilistic patents has not been carefully explored in the theoretical literature. We formalize this idea and show that the assessment of the likely welfare e¤ects of patent pools depends on whether the demand margin or the competitive margin is binding with probabilistic patents even when the constituent patents are complementary. This implies that the assessment is more nuanced and fact-intensive than recognized before. Gilbert and Katz (2006) provide an analysis of package licensing and compare the welfare properties of package licensing to those of component licensing under which each patent is licensed separately without any quantity discount. They focus on the e¤ects of package licensing on the licensee's incentives to invent around patents and invest in complementary assets. Package licensing in their model plays the role of raising licensee fees for the remaining technologies when the licensee succeeds in inventing around only part of the patent portfolio included in the package. As a result, package licensing can attenuate the incentives to invent around patents in comparison with component licensing. The reduced incentives can be welfare-enhancing because inventing-around activities are privately bene…cial, but socially wasteful. As in Gilbert and Katz, the combination of separately owned patents under the common administration of a patent pool plays a similar role of raising licensee fees for the surviving patents when the licensee fails to invalidate them all in court. However, in our model, the reduced incentives to litigate for the licensee may induce a higher overall licensing fee in the presence of patent pools even for complementary patents, thus retarding future innovations.
Our results seem to be consistent with recent empirical …ndings. Lampe and Moser (2010 , 2014 and Joshi and Nerkar (2011) provide the …rst empirical tests of the e¤ects of patent pools on innovation incentives. More speci…cally, Moser (2010, 2013 ) study the Sewing Machine Combination (1856-1877), the …rst patent pool in U.S. history, whereas Joshi and Nerkar (2011) study the e¤ects of patent pools in the recent global optical disc industry. In both cases, they …nd that patent pools inhibit, rather than enhance, innovation by insiders (pool members) and outsiders (licensees). 4 In particular, Moser (2010, 2013) show that the Sewing Machine Combination patent pool discouraged patenting and innovation. They attribute the negative incentive e¤ects of the patent pool to the fact that patent pools create more formidable entities in court and thus increase the threat of litigation for outside …rms, as their data show that outside …rms were at a greater risk of being sued while the pool was active, lowering expected pro…ts and discouraging innovation by outsiders. Lower rates of innovation by outsiders in turn reduced incentives for pool members to innovate. Lampe and Moser (2014) further extend their empirical analysis to examine patent pools in 20 industries in the 1930s. They …nd a substantial decline in patenting after the formation of a pool and come to the same conclusions as with the sewing machine industry. We develop a dynamic model of innovation in the presence of uncertain patent validity and litigation that is consistent with this empirical evidence on patent pools. In particular, our analysis shows that patent strength is an important consideration in the evaluation of patent pools as it a¤ects the terms of licensing when the litigation margin binds.
Our paper closely relates to Shapiro (2003) and Choi (2010) , who also recognize that IPR associated with patents are inherently uncertain or imperfect, at least until they have successfully survived a challenge in court. Choi's (2010) analysis focuses on incentives to litigate against each other's patents between potential pool members (i.e., insiders) and considers patent pools as an attempt to settle disputes on con ‡icting claims in the litigation process or in expectation of impending litigation. In contrast, this paper investigates incentives to litigate against outsiders with subsequent innovations that build upon existing patents. Shapiro (2003) proposes a general rule for evaluating proposed patent settlements, which is to require that "the proposed settlement generate at least as much surplus for consumers as they would have enjoyed had the settlement not been reached and the dispute instead been resolved through litigation."Finally, Gilbert (2002) provides a brief history of patent pools and points out that patent pools can be used to protect dubious patents from challenges. This paper provides a theoretical foundation of a mechanism through which dubious patents can be shielded from challenges to the validity of the patents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, as a benchmark case, we analyze the case of ironclad patents and show that patent pools with complementary patents promote subsequent innovations, echoing the basic presumption in the literature enunciated in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property (1995).
In section 3, we extend the analysis to consider probabilistic patents and explicitly consider strategic incentives to litigate. As a …rst step, we consider a situation in which only the litigation margin binds by abstracting away from the pricing externalities issue associated with the demand margin. This is to isolate the mechanism through which patent pools deter litigation and elevate royalty rates vis-à-vis independent licensing. In section 4, we analyze the full model that takes into account both the litigation and demand margins. Section 5 considers a public policy that mandates patent pools to engage in individual licensing and its welfare e¤ects. Section 6 expands on the basic model and considers extensions of the model to check the robustness of the main results. The last section concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Complementary Patent Pools and Technology Adoption
We consider a situation of multiple patents with dispersed ownership. For example, assume that there are two complementary patents, A and B, which are owned by two separate …rms. 5 As emphasized by Scotchmer (1991) , innovations are cumulative and the patents are deemed essential, as the commercialization of a new technology or product requires the practice of both patents. 6 As a benchmark, we look at the case where both patents are ironclad and cannot be challenged in court. We analyze the patent holders' incentives to form a pool and show how the formation of patent pools can a¤ect future incentives to develop new innovations.
Consider the following multi-stage game. In the …rst stage, the two …rms decide whether or not to form a patent pool. In the second stage, they set license fees that allow other …rms to use their technologies without infringing them. If they do not form a patent pool, they set the license fees independently. If they do form a patent pool, they can o¤er a package license. In the third stage, a downstream …rm C comes up with a potential innovation of value v, which cannot be practiced without consent of the holders of the essential patents.
The cost to implement the innovation is c 0, where c is randomly distributed with a cumulative distribution function G(:) and corresponding density function g(:): Assume that the reversed hazard rate of G(:), de…ned by r(:) = g()=G() is monotonically decreasing in its argument. Suppose that both …rms o¤er ex ante license contracts independently. Let f A and f B be the …xed license fees charged by …rm A and B, respectively. Then, …rm C develops the innovation only when its development cost is less than (v f A f B ) which occurs with
. Then, for a …xed royalty rate f j; …rm i maximizes f i G(v f A f B ) with respect to f i which yields the …rst order condition
Equation (1) implicitly de…nes …rm i's reaction function f i = (f j ). The Nash equilibrium license fees f A and f B are at the intersection of the two reaction functions. The monotone reversed hazard rate assumption guarantees the stability and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in license fees. With perfect complementarity and ironclad patents, both …rms are in a symmetric position and charge f A = f B = f : The total royalty rate in the absence of a patent pool is given by
In contrast, if …rms A and B form a patent pool and practice package licensing, the optimal royalty rate maximizes F G(v F ) with respect to F: Let F be the optimal ex ante …xed licensing fee for the pool. 7 Then, F satis…es the following …rst order condition:
Proposition 1 shows that aggregate license fees are lower when …rms form a patent pool.
Thus, pools promote subsequent innovation incentives in the presence of ironclad patents. 
Probabilistic Patent Rights and Litigation with Patent Pools
In the previous section, we have seen that patent pools of complementary technologies have salutary e¤ects of promoting subsequent innovations. However, this conclusion hinges crucially on the assumption of ironclad patents. If we recognize that patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court when challenged, licensing takes place in the shadow of patent litigation and the licensing terms will re ‡ect the strength of the patents.
In this section, we show that if patent pools are used as a mechanism to harbor weak patents and deter patent litigation, then they may induce higher royalty rates than would be paid if licenses were sold separately by independent patent holders. We assume a symmetric information structure in that and are common knowledge.
The timing of the game with probabilistic patents follows the set-up in the previous section with two additional litigation stages after the downstream …rm's decision of whether to buy the licenses or not. If the downstream …rm purchases both licenses, the game ends.
If the downstream …rm decides not to buy one (or both) of the licenses, the patent holder(s)
can choose whether to sue for infringement. If a patent pool has not formed, …rms A and B make their litigation decision simultaneously. 8 Let L 0 be the litigation cost for each …rm. In case of litigation with weak patents, …rm C will contest the validity of the patent in question. In the second additional stage, the court determines the validity of all challenged patents and litigation outcomes are revealed. If a patent has been challenged and upheld, its holder proposes a new license fee and …rm C decides whether to purchase the license or not. 9 In contrast, we assume that the fee for a purchased license can not be raised when the other patent has been challenged and invalidated. This essentially captures that when a patent holder sets a license fee, it is a commitment which can only be revoked when the downstream …rm refuses to license and instead infringes and challenges the patent. Meanwhile, when both patents have been challenged and validated, the patentees simultaneously choose their license fee. After the court has invalidated a patent, the downstream …rm can use the technology at no cost. If …rm C does not acquire a license of a validated or unchallenged patent, it is unable to produce and thus receives a pro…t of zero. To summarize, the game proceeds as follows.
(1) Firms A and B decide whether or not to form a patent pool.
(2) Firms A and B set license fees. If they form a patent pool, they coordinate their license fees. Otherwise, they set license fees independently. In this set-up the patent holders face not only a demand margin for subsequent innovations as in the previous section, but also a litigation margin. An increases in license fees can lead to …rms not developing the innovation or it can result in product development followed by patent litigation. As an intermediate step towards deriving the optimal license fee equilibrium with both active demand and litigation margins, we …rst consider a game that ignores the demand margin and focuses on the litigation margin. In other words, we assume that …rm C always develops the subsequent innovation and we analyze how litigation considerations in ‡uence the patentees'licensing decisions. That is, for the current section only, we consider a game with the following stage (3L) instead of (3):
(3L) Firm C develops the subsequent innovation.
One way to think about this is to assume that the downstream …rm has no development cost (c = 0). In this case, as we show below, …rm C always introduces the innovation. This approach allows us to abstract away from the pricing externalities issue associated with the demand margin. In section 4, we consider the full game with both the demand and litigation margins using the results of this section and the previous section. We now solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium with an active litigation margin only.
Litigation Incentives. Licensing occurs in the shadow of patent litigation in this framework. Throughout the paper, we focus on parameter values such that the threat of litigation (and counter-litigation) is credible and assume
This condition requires that the cost of litigation is su¢ ciently small relative to the value of the commercialised downstream product. In the Appendix we show the following lemma. holder charges v=2 and …rm C makes no pro…ts. 11 Hence, the downstream …rm's expected pro…t with litigation against patents A and B is
Under assumption (A), it holds that V AB 0, that is, challenging both patents always dominates remaining inactive. Now suppose …rm C does not purchase a license for technology A but acquires a license from B. If, in the resulting litigation, the validity of patent A is upheld, then …rm A charges v f B and …rm C receives no pro…ts. If the patent is invalidated, the downstream …rm can use technology A at no cost. Hence, the expected payo¤, when litigation arises with …rm A only, is
Similarly, the expected pro…ts of challenging patent B and purchasing the license for A are
Note that the payo¤ with exactly one litigation decreases in the license fee paid for the other technology. Finally, if …rm C accepts both license o¤ers, it receives
What is the optimal licensing (and litigation) strategy for …rm C? As convention, assume that if the downstream …rm is indi¤erent between two options, it chooses the one that involves less litigation. If the downstream …rm is indi¤erent between purchasing only A or only B, the …rm randomizes and acquires each license with probability 1=2. It can be shown that …rm C buys both licenses if
and V 0 V B , which requires
We illustrate the optimal licensing behavior of …rm C in Figure 1 below. The graph depicts the optimal strategy for any license fee pair set by the patent holders. Region 0 in Figure   1 below contains all license fee pairs that jointly satisfy conditions (3) and (4).
denote the license fee pair at which both conditions hold with equality. Alternatively, the downstream …rm prefers not to purchase licenses and challenge both patents if
and
Fee region AB of Figure 1 satis…es both of these two conditions. Finally, it is easy to check that there exist license fees that neither satisfy the conditions of region 0 nor those of region AB. For these license fees, the downstream …rm is best o¤ buying a license from one patentee while challenging the other patent. With exactly one litigation target, the downstream …rm prefers to purchase B and challenge patent A if V A V B , or
If the license fee for patent B is relatively small compared to f A , then the downstream …rm challenges patent A (region A). Otherwise, it contests the validity of patent B (region B). Let us now analyze the license fee equilibrium. In the absence of a patent pool, patentees
A and B set their license fees independently and maximize their respective expected pro…ts.
As shown in the Appendix, an individual patentee's best response function is a limit licensing strategy that ensures that the downstream …rm purchases the …rm's license rather than challenging the patent. The optimal limit license fee depends on the fee charged by the other patentee. If …rm j's license fee is low (f j f j ), the limit license fee of patentee i is the highest fee at which the downstream …rm prefers to purchase both licenses to challenging …rm i's patent. For intermediate fees, the limit licensing occurs just below the fee that would make the downstream …rm indi¤erent between challenging …rm A or …rm B's patent, that is, just above or below where (7) holds with equality. For higher values of f j , the downstream …rm challenges the other …rm's patent and the limit license fee for …rm i satis…es V j = V AB . Hence, the unique intersection of the best response functions is at
and total license fees with independent patent holders are
an increase in a …rm's patent strength raises the limit license fee it can charge. Thus, a patentee's equilibrium license fee increases in the strength of its own patent and decreases in the other patent's strength. form a pool and sell a package license to the two patents for a fee F . 12 The patent pool maximizes the joint pro…ts of the patent holders. The downstream …rm can either buy the package license or enter into litigation and challenge both pool patents or remain inactive.
When …rm C opts not to buy and to infringe on the patents, it needs to successfully challenge both pool patents in order to earn any pro…ts. By assumption (A), challenging 1 2 In Section 5 we consider the case of a patent pool selling individual licenses rather than a package license.
both patents dominates remaining inactive. The downstream …rm buys the package license if v F V AB , or
where F is the limit license fee for the patent pool. In order to avoid the cost of litigation, it is always optimal for the pool to set the limit license fee. 13 We are now in a position to compare the aggregate limit license fees charged by a pool and independent patentees when the litigation margin is binding. Figure 2 below depicts the aggregate license fee for each case in the (f A ; f B ) space. Independent patent holders set their equilibrium fees such that the downstream …rm is indi¤erent between buying both licenses or challenging exactly one patent. In contrast, a patent pool sets its package fee F such that the downstream …rm is indi¤erent between buying all licenses and challenging all patents. It thus holds that
and the next proposition follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose only the litigation margin is binding. A patent pool with a package license charges a higher aggregate limit license fee compared to independent patent holders,
In the presence of weak patents and litigation, we get the reverse result of Proposition 1. A patent pool issuing a package license is able to charge higher license fees than independent patent holders. Two arguments explain this result. First, the pool's package license imposes an all-or-nothing litigation proposition on the downstream …rm. The only way to reduce its payment to the pool is to successfully challenge all of the patents in the pool. By contrast, when individual patent holders market their license, the downstream …rm reduces its royalty payments with any successful litigation challenge. This ability to selectively challenge patents increases the downstream …rm's incentives to litigate with independent 1 3 Setting a higher fee and inducing litigation is never pro…table since the expected pro…ts from litigation are less than the pool's limit license fee,
patent holders. In this sense, pools can shield weak patents. Put di¤erently, it is always easier for the patent holders to satisfy the pool's limit licensing constraint (8) rather than the conditions (3) and (4) jointly when patents are licensed separately. This mechanism allows the pool to charge a higher aggregate license fee.
Second, independent patent holders are unable to sustain higher license fees than (f A ; f B )
because they are engaged in a Bertrand-type competition with respect to litigation. Suppose both individual patent holders set their fees above their equilibrium fees (f A ; f B ): In fee regions A and B, the downstream …rm challenges exactly one patent and the holders' license fees determine the litigation target. However, each individual patent holder is better o¤ reducing its license fee to avoid a possible challenge against its own patent. Hence, this litigation externality creates downward pressure on license fees, and individual patent holders compete each other down to the limit licensing levels. 14 ' 15 Figure 2: Equilibrium licensing fee with and without patent pool 1 4 This fee competition of not being the one litigation target of the downstream …rm arises for intermediate license fees of the other patent holder. In those cases, the best response of a patent holder is to limit price and shave the fee that makes the downstream …rm indi¤erent between challenging one or the other patent. 1 5 In Section 5, we consider a patent pool that issues individual licenses and is able to internalize this litigation externality.
when litigation costs are zero as
As the cost L increases, the pool's all-or-nothing litigation proposition further increases the di¤erence between the aggregate limit license fees since
We have shown that patent pools can elevate the total licensing fees when they are used to shield weak patents form the threat of litigation. However, the elevated licensing fees have no e¢ ciency consequences in the simple model where only the litigation margin binds.
Licensing fees are just a transfer between the patent holders and the downstream …rm. The only source of ine¢ ciency is costly litigation, which does not arise in equilibrium. In the next section, we extend our model to allow both the demand and the litigation margin to bind. incentives. This holds when the equilibrium fee from section 2 is less than the lowest equilibrium fee with a binding litigation margin, that is,
In this case, the downstream …rm has no incentive to litigate when …rms set their equilibrium licensing fees derived in the analysis of section 2, and patentees behave as if their patent were ironclad. The equilibrium license fees are thus given by
Case 2: Both litigation margins binding. When litigation costs are su¢ ciently small, each …rm's limit litigation fee from section 3 is less than its best response to the rival's limit litigation fee, that is, f i (f j ). For , both conditions are satis…ed if
In this case, the litigation margin binds for both …rms. When …rm j sets f j , …rm i has no incentive to increase its fee as it would trigger a challenge against its own patent. In addition, condition (10) ensures that both patent holders have no incentive to decrease their license fee either. Thus, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, each patentee sets its licensing fee at the level that deters litigation and we get the same equilibrium fees as in section 3, that is (f A ; f B ).
When both patents are of equal strength ( = ); conditions (9) and (10) cannot be violated at the same time. This means that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the full game, …rms are either constrained by the demand margin and price like in section 2, or they are constrained by the litigation margin and set the equilibrium fees of section 3.
Case 3: Litigation margin only binds for …rm A. If patents are of asymmetric strength, a third case can arise in which conditions (9) and (10) are both violated. In this case, holder A with the weaker patent is constrained by the litigation limit whereas holder B operates on the demand margin. 16 We delegate the formal proof of this discussion to the Appendix and state the main result for the licensing game with independent patent holders.
Lemma 3 When litigation costs and patent strengths are su¢ ciently low, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the patent holders set their limit litigation license fees at f A and f B , respectively.
Equilibrium License Fees with Patent Pool. Now suppose that …rms A and B form a patent pool. Again, the optimal package license fee depends on whether the demand or the litigation margin binds. Note that the pool's optimal fee from section 2, F , is completely determined by the demand conditions (that is, the cost distribution function G), while the limit license fee F is determined by the strength of the patents and litigation costs. When the pool patents are su¢ ciently strong and litigation is costly, it holds that F < F and the pool can set its package license fee as if its patents are ironclad, as there is no threat of litigation by the downstream …rm. Otherwise, the litigation margin binds and the patent pool sets its limit license fee at F to deter litigation. Hence, the patent pool's optimal licensing fee is given by min[F ; F ].
Comparison of Aggregate License Fees. The welfare e¤ects of patent pools depend on whether patent pools elevate or reduce the overall licensing fees paid by the downstream …rm. From the above analysis it is clear that in Case 1 where independent …rms are not constrained by the litigation margin, the standard result with ironclad patents obtains and a pool charges lower aggregate fees as it avoids royalty stacking. 17 However, when the litigation margin binds for independent patent holders, that is, condition (10) is satis…ed, we get the same result as in section 3 and patent pools are able to extract a higher total license fee. Since F < F , a su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that the unconstrained license fee of the patent pool F is larger than the aggregate limit license fee F when the litigation margin binds for independent patent holders. Since 1 6 We analyze this case more closely in our working paper, Choi and Gerlach (2013) , and show that in such situations, a pure-strategy equilibrium in license fees might fail to exist. 1 7 If condition (9) holds, patent pools charge lower fees since
F = (0) we get that F < F if and only if
A necessary condition for (11) to hold is that the litigation margins bind with independent patent holders, that is, f B (f A ). Furthermore, we can explicitly solve this condition and show that it is satis…ed if and only if
Upon inspection, we …nd that if the patent strength parameters are su¢ ciently small, then there always exists a threshold value L 0 (> 0) such that for any litigation cost L < L 0 , the total license fee is higher with a patent pool. We thus get the following result. Our analysis so far has taken an ex post view by considering a situation in which upstream …rms already hold patents, and has not considered the e¤ects of pools on ex ante incentives to innovate for upstream …rms. Since …rms join a pool only if this increases their pro…ts, the prospect of forming a patent pool encourages innovation. However, in our framework with probabilistic patents, we also need to consider the e¤ects of patent pools on the quality of innovations. The ability to shield weak patents with higher license fees provides more incentives to produce weak patents rather than strong patents; if stronger patents are associated with higher quality innovations, the prospect of patent pools may lead to more weak patents of suspect quality.
Patent Pool with Individual Licenses
In the previous section, we showed that patent pools can be anticompetitive even with complementary patents, once we account for the probabilistic nature of patent rights. By o¤ering package licensing, patent pools deprive the downstream …rm of the ability to selectively challenge patents. This allows a patent pool to charge higher licensing fees relative to independent licensing. By contrast, in this section, we discuss the case where the pool o¤ers individual licenses for each patented technology and coordinates pricing. We …rst characterize the optimal individual license fees for the pool, discuss the pool's optimal form of licensing, and derive conditions under which mandatory individual licensing increases total welfare.
Pro…t-Maximizing Individual License Fees. Suppose the patent pool issues individual licenses for each patent, charging f A and f B ; respectively. In this case, the downstream …rm's litigation behavior is the same as in the analysis with independent patent holders.
However, the patent pool maximizes the joint pro…ts from both patents. In what follows, we focus on the case where only the litigation margin binds. The case where both margins are operating can be found in the proof of the next lemma. With individual licenses, the pool has three strategic options: limit licensing both patents, exactly one patent or inducing challenges against both patents. First consider the strategy of limit pricing exactly one patent and inducing litigation against the other patent. The highest possible limit license fee for patent i while the downstream …rm challenges patent j is f i = p i v + L=(1 p j ): At this license fee, the patent pool makes an expected pro…t of
Limit licensing exactly one patent yields the same expected payo¤ independent of which patent is selected as the litigation target. 18 Furthermore, the pool always prefers limit licensing one patent to inducing litigation against both patents (in which case it would get the same pro…ts minus the cost of litigation of 2L). Finally, limit licensing exactly one patent dominates limit licensing both at (f A ; f B ) if the above expected pro…ts exceed
Thus, when litigation costs are su¢ ciently small, a patent pool with individual licenses is best o¤ selling one license and inducing a legal challenge against the other patent. As we show in the Appendix to the next lemma, this result readily generalizes to the case where both demand and litigation margins are operating. 19 Lemma 4 Consider a patent pool issuing individual licenses. There exists a threshold value L 00 ; with 0 < L 00 < L 0 ; such that for L L 00 ; the patent pool's optimal license fees induce the downstream …rm to buy the license for one patent and challenge the other patent. For higher litigation costs, L > L 00 ; the patent pool charges aggregate limit license fees of min n F ; F o and no litigation occurs. 1 8 This implies that setting fees such that the downstream …rm is indi¤erent between litigating A or B yields the same payo¤ as fees at which it strictly prefers challenging one patent. 1 9 The only di¤erence is that the patent pool's local maximizer in regions A, B and 0 can be interior. Hence, candidate maximizers of the pool's fee setting problem are the interior solution or the limit licensing fees (f A ; f B ) of region 0, the interior solution to regions A=B or, as above, the corner solution at fi = piv + L=(1 pj).
This result is somewhat surprising. If the litigation cost is su¢ ciently small (L L 00 ), litigation arises, although the joint pro…ts of the upstream and downstream …rms are lower compared to licensing arrangements that avoid litigation. The reason for this is that the pool's limit license fee for avoiding an additional litigation increases exponentially in the number of patents that are to be challenged. Thus, when faced with one patent litigation, the downstream …rm is willing to pay a higher fee for the other patent to avoid a situation where it has to challenge both patents successfully to get any returns. From the pool's perspective, the gain from this fee extraction with one sold license has to be weighed against the cost of litigation against the other patent. Hence, selling one license only is optimal when litigation costs are low.
Let us also brie ‡y relate this result to the limit license equilibrium with independent patent holders. The lemma shows that the upstream pro…ts may be maximized with (proposed) fees above the equilibrium limit license fees for independent patent holders from sections 3 and 4. As mentioned above, such license fees are not sustainable with independent patent holders as there exists a unilateral incentive to reduce the license fee to avoid a challenge against the holder's own patent. A patent pool with individual licenses can internalize this externality and sustain the upstream pro…t-maximizing license fee levels. 
Extensions
Licensing and litigation with more than two patents. In this extension we show that the qualitative results of our above analysis hold more generally for n 2 complementary technologies when patent strength is symmetric (and equal to ). It is again useful to …rst consider the model when only the litigation margin is binding. Suppose patent holder i o¤ers a license for patent i 2 f1; 2::ng at a fee f i . The optimal licensing and litigation strategy of the downstream …rm can be characterized as follows. 20 Lemma 5 There exists a l 2 f0::ng such that the downstream …rm buys l of the (weakly) cheapest licenses and challenges the remaining n l patents. The optimal number of patent challenges increases in the overall licensing fee.
For a given number of litigation cases, the downstream …rm never challenges a patent with a low license fee whilst buying a more expensive license of another patent. The incentive to litigate depends on the overall licensing fee and its distribution. Challenging the marginal patent implies the risk of losing the case and the net returns from buying the infra-marginal licenses. Hence, the higher the license fees, the lower the potential loss from litigation and the higher the number of patent challenges. Now consider the best response function of an individual patent holder for a given fee pro…le of the other n 1 patentees. Suppose patent holder j's license fee is ranked between 1 and l 1. In this case, slightly increasing its own license fee is always optimal until the patent at rank l is challenged. Next assume that owner j's patent is the marginal patent at rank l . The downstream …rm prefers not to challenge patent j if
This is the n-…rm equivalent of condition (3) in section 3. Again we can show that patent holder j has no incentive to violate this condition and prefers to limit license to avoid litigation. 21 Hence, in the unique symmetric fee setting equilibrium, …rms charge f i = f (n) such that (12) holds with equality and we get
The individual equilibrium license fee is decreasing in n as more patents increase the total infra-marginal license fees which raise incentives to challenge patents. Note, however, that the total licensing fee for the downstream …rm nf (n) is increasing in the number of patents.
Next consider a patent pool o¤ering a package license for all n patents at a fee F . The downstream …rm buys the package license if and only if
The probability of invalidating all patents in court is decreasing in the number of patented technologies. Thus, the limit license fee for a patent pool with license packaging increases in n.
Let us compare the aggregate license fees with independent patent holders and a pool.
Since the pool's limit license fee increases exponentially and faster than the aggregate fees for the individual patent holders, we can show in the Appendix to the next proposition that
Hence, when only the litigation margin is operating, patent pools charge more than individual patentees for any n 2. Now suppose the demand margin binds. Note that while the aggregate license fee with independent patent holders nf (n) increases, the pool's optimal package fee F is invariant in the number of patents n. This means that there must exist an upper bound on the number of patents, above which the litigation margin for independent patent holders is unable to restrict the fees below the pool's optimal package fee F .
In other words, with active demand and litigation margins, pools set higher license fees than independent patentees if and only if the number of patents is not too large. The next proposition makes this statement more precise.
Proposition 6
If nf (n) F ; then patent pools with n 2 patents charge higher total license fees and reduce total welfare relative to independent patent holders. This condition is harder to satisfy, the higher the number of complementary patents. There exists a …nite upper bound n on the number of patents, above which pools increase total welfare. After the license fees are set, the game continues as before. That is, the downstream …rm decides whether to buy the package license, buy individual licenses, or whether to infringe and induce litigation. We assume that pool members share royalties equally.
Independent Licensing
Our …rst result establishes whether a patent pool with independent licensing by its members is still able to sustain higher fees relative to a situation where no pool has formed.
Proposition 7
Consider a patent pool with independent licensing by its members. If n > 2, then there exist equilibria in which a patent pool sells its package at a total license fee exceeding the total price charged in the absence of a pool.
Independent licensing is not su¢ cient to prevent the patent pool from setting higher fees when there are more than two patents involved. To see this, let the pool charge a individual patent holder would get its stake holding of F=n from the pool. Alternatively, the patent holder could deviate to a license fee g < f in order to induce the downstream …rm to buy its license and enter litigation with the other patent holders rather than buying the pool package. The limit license fee g for the deviator satis…es
An individual patent holder has no incentive to deviate if F=n g. As the limit license fee increases faster in F than the individual stake holding, there exists a maximum package license fee, F ILR ; a pool can charge without inducing deviation. We show in the Appendix that if n > 2, it holds that F < F ILR < F . Despite the individual licensing requirement, the pool is able to charge a higher price than in the absence of patent pools. When there are exactly two patents, F ILR is equal to F and, in the terminology of Lerner and Tirole (2004) the pool is strongly unstable.
For more than two patents, the independent licensing requirement is unable to prevent pools from charging higher license fees in the context of weak, complementary patents. In the following we consider the e¤ect of independent licensing with an additional constraint.
Suppose the pool is required to unbundle the patents. That is, the pool is not allowed to give a package discount and has to sell the package license at a fee not exceeding the sum of the individual license fees.
Proposition 8 Consider independent licensing together with an unbundling requirement.
Then, there exists no equilibrium in which the pool is able to sell its package license at a fee exceeding total license fees in the absence of a patent pool.
In the presence of weak patents, independent licensing together with a strict unbundling requirement can screen out welfare-reducing patent pools. The unbundling requirement equates total license fees from the pool's package and the independent licensors, that is, F = nf . This means that if the pool is setting a package fee larger than the limit litigation fee F = nf (charged in the absence of a pool), it is no longer optimal for the downstream …rm to buy the pool package, and litigation involving at least one patent will arise. Faced with a positive probability of litigation, an individual patentee makes strictly less than f = F=n in expected terms. Moreover, deviating to a slightly lower fee makes the deviator's license the cheapest one which avoids litigation with certainty, and yields license revenues of approximately f . Hence, it can be shown that deviations from any license fee combination F = nf > F are always pro…table. The highest pool package license fee that can be sustained is the limit litigation fee F = n f which obtains in the absence of a pool.
Sequential litigation. In our analysis so far, we assume that once the downstream …rm infringes on both patents, litigation challenges arise simultaneously. This is a good description of many situations in which a short lead time to commercialisation is crucial. In some situations, however, the patentees and the downstream …rm might be able to use a sequential litigation strategy instead. We brie ‡y discuss how the analysis with a binding litigation margin would change under this assumption.
First consider a patent pool when the downstream …rm has not purchased any license.
Filing suits sequentially entails the same overall probability of having both patents invali- weak, patent pools reduce social welfare as they raise total licensing fees and hinder subsequent innovations. This conclusion is robust to extensions of our analysis, which allow for more than two patents and sequential litigation strategies. We further explore the policy implications of mandated individual licenses to make the pool patents more vulnerable to litigation and command lower limit license fees. We …nd that the welfare e¤ects of such policy mandates crucially depend on the size of the litigation cost relative to the value of the innovation. We also show that enforcing an independent licensing requirement for pool patents is not su¢ cient to prevent the pool from charging higher aggregate license fees. Hence, overall, our analysis suggests that a blanket approval of patent pools based on the complementary nature of the included patents is not warranted, and a more cautious approach that takes into account the strength of the patents and incentives to litigate is called for.
Proof of Proposition 1. As we require this analysis with n 2 patents in section 6, we prove the result for more than two …rms at this point. The …rst-order condition for patent holder i 2 f1::ng is
Hence the equilibrium license fees (f 1 ::f n ) satisfy
Evaluate the …rst order condition (2) for the patent pool at F = n P j=1 f j , which yields
This implies the desired result that F > F .
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose no license has been purchased and there are independent patent holders. Given patent holder j sues, patent holder i sues if
Since LHS increases in p i , the condition is harder to satisfy for …rm i = A; thus the binding constraint for both patent holders to sue is
Consider a patent pool (which o¤ers a package license or independent licenses) when no license has been bought. The pool sues for infringement against both patents rather than for infringement against only the stronger patent if
If this condition holds, condition (App-1) is always satis…ed. When (App-1) holds, we have L < v and no litigation at all is not optimal for the pool. Hence, the pool always sues for infringement against both patents. Now suppose only one license, say for technology j, has been purchased. The litigation condition for independent patent holders and a pool issuing individual licenses is the same, that is,
denote the downstream …rm's payo¤ when buying with f j > v L=p i such that there is no incentive to sue for infringement against patent i, where V j0 = v f j . Check that
This means that V AB V j0 for all f j > v L=p i if and only if
This condition is harder to satisfy for i = A and p i = . Rearranging terms yields assumption (A) in the text. It is easy to check that for any 0 and 0, assumption (A) is more restrictive than (App-2). Hence, by assumption (A), the downstream …rms prefers not buying any licenses rather than buying one license whenever the patentee has no incentive to sue exactly one patent. The lemma follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the best response f i = (f j ) for patentee i to license fee f j of patentee j. If f j f j , then …rm i prefers to set the highest fee that avoids litigation (which is at V 0 = V i ) rather than pricing in region i where the downstream …rm buys the other …rm's license and challenges patent i since
For f j < f j p j v + L=(1 p i ), limit licensing occurs at the highest f i that ensures V j > V i :
The limit license increases in f j while the expected pro…ts from litigation in region i are decreasing. Hence, avoiding litigation is optimal. This also implies that setting the license fee that satis…es (7) with equality and entering litigation with probability 1/2 is always dominated by marginally cutting the license fee to avoid litigation with probability 1. Finally, in the third segment, the limit licensing fee satis…es V j = V AB which always exceeds patentee i's expected pro…ts when both patents are litigated since
The best response for patent holder i is the limit licensing strategy
where > 0 is an in…nitesimally small number. From this follows that the unique Nash equilibrium is at the intersection of the respective …rst segment of each best response function, that is, at (f A ; f B ).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let k i (f i ; f j ), i 6 = j, denote …rm i's pro…ts in region k 2 f0; A; B; ABg:
First, consider …rm i's best response function for 0
Since i i (f i ; f j ) is independent of f i it follows that the best response function for 0 f j f j is continuous and given
there exists a Nash equilibrium in which …rms charge f A and f B , respectively. Next assume
De…ne the local maximizer in region j as
This maximizer satis…es the …rst-order condition
Proof of Lemma 4. The patent pool's pro…ts with individual licenses in the four regions of the license fee space from section 3 are given by
It follows straight from the discontinuity at V k = V AB that license fees in region AB are never optimal. Let V 0 = v F denote the argument that maximizes 0 : It then follows from the de…nition of the pro…ts that if F f A +f B ; then any f A +f B = F maximizes the pool's global pro…ts. Further let
are a license fee pair that -if interior -maximizes the pool's pro…t in regions A and B.
The maximizer in regions A and B is thus either an interior solution ( b
or a boundary solution ( v+L=(1 ); v+L=(1 )). The next step is to show that if F > f A +f B ; that is the local maximizer in region 0 is at (
Hence, for any F > f A + f B , we get b From our analysis in the proof of Lemma 4 we know that the interior maximizer in regions A and B satis…es
Since F > F the minimum value the RHS can take is
and the boundary solution in regions A and B holds. This implies that package licensing dominates since
(ii) Total welfare ranking: Suppose 0 L L 00 : Total welfare with package licensing is welfare superior to individual licenses if
which always holds due to V 0 > V B : Consider L 00 < L L 0 where a pool with individual licensing charges F = f A + f B : Individual licensing is welfare superior if
which always holds since F minfF ; F g: Finally, for L > L 0 a patent pool charges F in total licensing fees both with individual and package licenses, and welfare is the same.
Proof of Lemma 5. To ensure that the threat of litigation is credible, we submit the analysis to the condition
which can be derived in a similar way to condition (A) in the proof of Lemma 1. Rank all license fee o¤ers in increasing order. Buying the l lowest ranked licenses and litigating against the remaining n l patents yields
Litigating against patent i and buying the license of patent j is never optimal when f j > f i .
It 
The …rst condition implies the second since
Next verify that V (i) V (i 1) if
and V (i 1) V (i 2) if
Again the …rst condition implies the second since
From this the lemma follows.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, we show that patent holders prefer to limit license as claimed in the text. If the patent holder j charges a higher fee than the limit license fee in the text, the downstream …rm challenges his patent. In this case, the patent holder only receives a return if his patent is upheld by the court. His share of the total upstream pro…t is determined by how many other patents are upheld. Let Prfkjn l g denote the probability that k out of the n l remaining litigated patents are upheld. Then the expected pro…t from inducing litigation is
Since patent holder j's expected market share is always less than , it follows that limit licensing always dominates. Second, in order to show that condition (13) The last point to show for this proposition is the existence of an upper bound on n below which patent pools charge higher fees. Let f (n) denote the Nash equilibrium license fee with n independent patent holders when only the demand margin binds (see proof of Proposition 1). Total license fees with individual patent holders are n min n f (n); f (n) o whereas the patent pool charges min n F (n); F o : From F < nf (n) and (13) follows that individual patent holders charge lower fees if nf (n) < F . Since nf (n) is increasing and approaching v as n becomes large while F < v is not a¤ected by the number of patents, this condition must fail to hold when n is su¢ ciently large.
Proof of Proposition 7. For notational convenience, consider the optimal licensing of the downstream …rm when n independent …rms charge the same f i = f . From our analysis in Lemma 5 follows that if (k) < f (k 1); then the optimal number of licenses bought is l = k 1 where 
Both expressions increase in F but the slope of g is larger since n > (1 ) n 1 : Let F ILR denote the value of F such that F=n = g while for F F ILR deviations are not pro…table.
Next we show that F F ILR < F : First, check that g takes a higher value than F=n at F = F : This follows since g(F ) F =n increases in L and at L = 0 this di¤erence is [ n + (1 ) n 1]v=n > 0 for all ; n: Second, check that F=n takes at least as high a value as g at F = F : We get @(f g(F )) @L = 1 1 (n 1) 2 (1 ) n 1 0 as the expression takes value 0 at n = 2 and increases in n. Furthermore, at L = 0, f g(F ) 0 if and only if (1 ) 2 (1 ) n (1 + (n 2)) 0: Check that the LHS takes value 0 at n = 2 and increases in n if and only if ln(1 )(1 + (n 2)) + < 0 which holds since the expression equals + ln(1 ) < 0 at n = 2 and decreases in n. It follows that for n = 2, F =n = g(F ) and F ILR = F is the unique intersection. If n > 2, F =n > g(F ) and F <F ILR < F : Finally, note that with asymmetric stake holdings, the pool could not do any better as F ILR is constrained by the …rm with the smallest stake.
Hence, symmetric stakes are optimal.
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider F = nf F = n (n). From our previous analysis it follows that buying all individual licenses or the same priced pool package is dominated by infringing on at least one license and entering litigation. Given the downstream …rm's optimal number of license purchases l (f ), a patentee expects pro…ts of
where the optimal number of licenses bought is l = k 1 if (k) < f (k 1). For f (n), pro…ts are E i (f ) = f . The higher is f , the lower the number of purchased licenses and the more litigation. For f 2 [ (l + 1); (l)], l licenses are purchased and the pro…t increases in f since @E i =@f = l(1 ) n l =n > 0: This slope is 1 for l = n but strictly less than 1 for higher values of f and lower values of l . This implies E i (f ) < f for any f > (n) or l < n. If 0 < l < n 1, the optimal deviation for an individual licensor is to shave the license fee f and avoid litigation with certainty. This deviation yields f and since E i (f ) < f for l < n 1 it is always pro…table. If f > (1) and l = 0, the optimal deviation to avoid litigation requires that the downstream prefers to buy from the deviator rather than litigate. The limit litigation fee is then g = (1). Since
deviation is pro…table for any f > (n). For f (n), there is no litigation and an individual patentee has no incentive to reduce its license fee. Hence, in any equilibrium it has to hold that F = nf F :
